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Cybercrime and Punishment: The Russian Mafia and 
Russian Responsibility to Exercise Due Diligence to 
Prevent Trans-boundary Cybercrime 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In December 2013, 110 million consumer accounts were hacked 
as a result of a security breach at Target—probably the largest 
security breach in U.S. history.1 It was subsequently disclosed that 
the hackers used Russian-made malware to pull off the attack. 
Although unconfirmed, many analysts suggested that the Russian 
Mafia orchestrated the breach.2 
In Russia, an extremely profitable and professional cybercrime 
industry3 has emerged. Overall, Russian hackers have been 
responsible for a disproportionate share of cybercrime.4 In 2013, the 
Russian cybercrime industry made at least $1.9 billion dollars.5 
Russian-speaking countries also contribute significantly to overall 
cybercrime.6 Much of the crime is attributable to organized groups, 
such as the Russian Mafia.7 
 
 1. Kacper Pempel, Largest Single Personal Data Hack Ever? 360mn Stolen Account 
Credentials Found Online, RT (Mar. 1, 2014 1:31 AM), http://rt.com/news/largest-hack-
stolen-credentials-287/. 
 2. See Walter Russell Mead, Russian Mob May be Behind Target Hacking, THE 
AMERICAN INTEREST (Jan. 17, 2014 12:20 PM), http://www.the-american-
interest.com/blog/2014/01/17/russian-mob-may-be-behind-target-hacking/. 
 3. The department of Justice classifies cybercrimes into three categories: (1) Cyber 
attacks – crime where the computer system is the target, such as viruses, DoS attacks and other 
sabotage or vandalism; (2) Cyber theft – where a computer is used to steal money through 
extortion, embezzlement or other means; (3) Other Computer Security Incidents: breaches 
such as phishing, adware, or theft of information. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CYBERCRIME 
AGAINST BUSINESS, 2005, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cb05.pdf. This Comment is primarily concerned with 
either cyber attacks or cyber theft as such crimes tend to have significant or substantial 
consequences sufficient to trigger the international due diligence obligation.  
 4. Global Security Report May 2012, GROUP IB, http://www.group-
ib.com/images/media/global_security_report_201205.pdf. 
 5. John Casaretto, Report: Russia’s CyberCrime Market Hits $1.9 Billion, SILICONE 
ANGLE (Oct. 9, 2013), http://siliconangle.com/blog/2013/10/09/report-russias-
cybercrime-market-hits-1-9-billion/. 
 6. Jarrod Rifkind, Cybercrime in Russia, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Jul. 
14, 2011), https://csis.org/blog/cybercrime-russia.  
 7. I will use the phrase Russian Mafia interchangeably with Russian organized crime. For an 
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The cost of cybercrime is even greater than those statistics 
suggest. One study, which included the costs of clean up after an 
attack but not the additional costs of lawsuits filed after a breach, 
concluded that cybercrime cost $113 billion dollars.8 
The increased prevalence of trans-boundary cybercrime, coupled 
with Russia’s unwillingness to aggressively pursue the Russian Mafia 
and other cybercriminals, leads to the question of whether Russia has 
an international obligation to prevent such crimes. So far, Russia has 
refused to sign on to the Council of Europe Convention on Cyber 
Crime, in part due to its reluctance to take upon itself an obligation 
to cooperate in the investigation of the numerous cyber-attacks 
caused by its residents or using its infrastructure.9 Likewise, because 
of the difficulty of establishing direct attribution or complicity, 
Russia has thus far not been held accountable for failure to prevent 
cyber-attacks such as those that were launched against Estonia in 
2007 and 2008 or the ongoing cybercrime carried out by Russian 
organized crime.10 
This Comment argues that Russia has an obligation to monitor 
and prevent trans-boundary cybercrime under the standard of due 
diligence. Due diligence has never been applied directly to 
cybercrime, but it is increasingly viewed as a general obligation and 
customary expected state conduct.11 It is a concept deeply rooted in 
international law in a wide variety of fields including environmental 
law, human rights, and the prevention of crime. Moreover, Russia’s 
involvement in such treaties as the Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime [Palermo Convention] implies that Russia has 
accepted at least parts of this duty of due diligence.12 
 
overview of the structure of the Russian Mafia, see JAMES O. FINCKENAUR & YURI A. VORONIN, 
THE THREAT OF RUSSIAN ORGANIZED CRIME, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (2001).  
 8. Willie Jones, How Much Does Cybercrime Cost? $113 Billion, IEEE SPECTRUM (Nov. 
22, 2013 23:12 GMT), http://spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/telecom/security/how-much-
does-cybercrime-cost. 
 9. Putin Defies Convention on Cybercrime, C NEWS (Mar. 27, 2008 10:04:15), 
http://eng.cnews.ru/news/top/indexEn.shtml?2008/03/27/293913. 
 10. Casimir C. Carey III, The International Community Must Hold Russia Accountable 
for its Cyber Militias, SMALL WARS J. (Mar. 27, 2013 2:30 AM), 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-international-community-must-hold-russia-
accountable-for-its-cyber-militias. 
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. See infra Part IV. 
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Part II of this Comment will look at the inadequacy of 
alternative grounds for holding Russia responsible such as direct 
attribution or complicity. In Part III, the standard of due diligence 
will be discussed in depth. Particular attention will be given to the 
question of what standard of due diligence should be enforced in the 
cyber context. Russia’s additional treaty obligations under the 
Palermo Convention also supplement its obligation under customary 
law and will be considered in Part IV. Having established a possible 
standard for due diligence, Part V. will then describe the Russian 
Mafia and Russia’s efforts to prevent organized cybercrime. In Part 
VI., Russia’s efforts will be held up to the standard of due diligence 
to show that Russia has fallen short of its due diligence obligation to 
prevent trans-boundary cyber-attacks and cybercrime from its 
territory. Finally, in Part VII, this Comment will conclude on a 
hopeful note by looking at a new Russian proposal that if passed and 
fully implemented would likely meet the State’s due diligence 
obligation.13 
II. DIFFICULTY OF PROVING DIRECT ATTRIBUTION OR 
COMPLICITY FOR CYBERCRIME AND CYBER-ATTACKS 
One possible way that Russia could be held accountable for its 
failure to prevent trans-boundary cybercrime is through its direct 
involvement in the attacks, or through knowing complicity.14 In 
particular, Russia was accused of either being directly responsible 
for—or at the very least complicit—in the wide-ranging cyber-attacks 
that crippled neighboring Estonia in 2007 and 2008.15 For instance, 
tools used by hackers were stored on government servers and 
infrastructure and attacks came from government IP addresses.16 
Scholars have written about the Estonia conflict and debated 
 
  
 14. For an explanation of complicity and its relationship to state responsibility, see 
generally, HELMUT PHILIPP AUST, COMPLICITY AND THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
(2011). See also Vassilis P. Tzevelekos, In Search of Alternative Solutions: Can the State of 
Origin Be Held Internationally Responsible for Investors’ Human Rights Abuses That Are Not 
Attributable to It?, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 155, 170–75 (2010). 
 15. See Behind the Estonia Cyberattacks, RADIO FREE EUROPE (Mar. 6, 2009), 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Behind_The_Estonia_Cyber-attacks/1505613.html 
[hereinafter Behind the Estonia Cyberattacks]; see also Carey, supra note 10. 
 16. Behind the Estonia Cyberattacks, supra note 15; See also Arthur Bright, Estonia 
Accuses Russia of ‘Cyberattack,’ CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (May 17, 2007), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0517/p99s01-duts.html.  
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whether Russia was directly responsible or complicit in the attacks 
due to the highly sophisticated and coordinated nature of the 
attacks.17 However, the government has strongly denied any 
complicity or direct involvement.18 In the recent conflict with 
Ukraine over the Crimea, cyber-attacks and disruptions of services 
also coincided with the deployment of troops.19 
Yet, despite some limited evidence of direct involvement or 
complicity, Russia is unlikely to be held responsible for direct 
involvement or complicity. The standard set out by the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) for such a charge is quite difficult to prove. In 
the Corfu Channel Case, the seminal case on attribution, the ICJ 
rejected a British argument that Albania was responsible through 
“acquiescence” and “collusion” for mines that led to the destruction 
of British ships.20 In rejecting this argument, the ICJ suggested that 
such a charge of “exceptional gravity” required a “degree of 
certainty” that the British had been unable to prove.21 
While some cyber-attacks have been successfully decoded and 
tentatively attributed to their sources,22 such attribution is unlikely 
in the wide range of cyber-attacks being carried out from Russia on 
an ongoing basis.23 Determining origin is a time intensive and 
inconclusive endeavor as shown by the efforts to decode Stuxnet—
the cyber weapon that was used to sabotage Iran’s nuclear 
 
 17. See Stephen Herzog, Revisiting the Estonian Cyber Attacks: Digital Threats and 
Multinational Responses, 4 J. STRATEGIC SECURITY, Summer 2011, 49 (2011).  
 18. See Nate Anderson, Massive DDoS Attacks Target Estonia; Russia Accused, ARS 
TECHNICA (May 14, 2007 6:45 AM), http://arstechnica.com/security/2007/05/massive-
ddos-attacks-target-estonia-russia-accused/. A member of the Russian Duma allegedly has 
stated that one of his aides was responsible for the attack, but the official Russian position has 
been to deny any involvement. See Behind the Estonia Cyberattacks, supra note 15. 
 19. Ukraine Crisis: Ukraine’s Telecommunications Hit by Cyberattacks, REUTERS (Mar. 
4, 2014), http://www.straitstimes.com/breaking-news/world/story/ukraine-crisis-ukraines-
telecommunications-hit-cyber-attacks-20140304. But see Mark Clayton, Where are the 
Cyberattacks? Russia’s Curious Forbearance in Ukraine, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Mar. 
3, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2014/0303/Where-are-the-
cyber-attacks-Russia-s-curious-forbearance-in-Ukraine.-video. 
 20. See Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.) 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9). 
 21. Id. at 17. 
 22. See Ellen Nakashima & Joby Warrick, Stuxnet was Work of U.S. and Israeli Experts, 
Officials Say, WASH. POST (June 2, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/stuxnet-was-work-of-us-and-israeli-experts-officials-
say/2012/06/01/gJQAlnEy6U_story.html.  
  23.  Because attacks can originate from machines around the world, pinpointing the 
controller or designer of a specific attack is highly imprecise. See Anderson, supra note 18.  
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program.24 Moreover, any government complicity with the Russian 
Mafia’s cyber activities is most likely attributable to corruption or 
bribed officials rather than official government policy.25 Thus, 
evidence of complicity is likely to be sparse and insufficient. It is 
unlikely that such a “degree of certainty” will ever be established 
regarding cybercrimes.26 
In addition, even if sufficient evidence existed, liability through 
complicity and direct attribution is generally limited in scope because 
it would only apply to those cases where complicity or direct 
attribution could be proved.27 In other words, even if the Russian 
government’s responsibility for the attacks in Estonia were firmly 
established, it would do little to establish a more general state 
responsibility for the trans-boundary harm caused by non-state 
actors. Therefore, despite some evidence of complicity between the 
Mafia and the Russian government, complicity or direct attribution 
are unlikely to provide adequate grounds for state liability. This 
Comment seeks to establish an alternative and more general basis for 
Russian responsibility for trans-boundary cybercrime based on the 
principle of due diligence 
III. DUE DILIGENCE STANDARD IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
While international law does not impose strict responsibility 
upon a state for injuries suffered by a foreign state as a result of its 
conduct or the conduct of its citizens, states are generally seen as 
responsible for negligent conduct.28 More specifically, a state is 
 
 24. Id. For an in depth look at the painstaking efforts required to decode Stuxnet, see 
Kim Zetter, How Digital Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, the Most Menacing Malware in History, 
WIRED (July, 11, 2011), http://www.wired.com/2011/07/how-digital-detectives-
deciphered-stuxnet/all/1. 
 25. For a description of Mafia influence and corruption in the judicial system, see infra 
Part VI. For an overview of attribution of conduct to a state generally, see U.N. LEGISLATIVE 
SERIES, MATERIALS ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL 
ACTS, 27–96 (2012), available at 
http://legal.un.org/legislativeseries/documents/Book25/Book25_part1_ch2.pdf. 
 26. For a detailed analysis of various proposed standards of proof for state responsibility, 
see Scott J. Shackelford and Richard B. Andres, State Responsibility for Cyber-attacks: 
Competing Standards for a Growing Problem, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 971 (2011). 
 27. See MATERIALS ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONALLY 
WRONGFUL ACTS, supra note 25. 
 28. OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 1, 508–11 (Sir Robert Jennings QC & 
Sir Arthur Watts KCMG QC eds., 9th ed. 2008). 
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required to exercise due diligence to prevent citizens or others 
residing within its territory from committing trans-boundary harm.29 
It is well established in international law that states are required 
to prevent the use of their territory or resources to cause injury to 
another state or citizens of another state.30 For instance, in the Trail 
Smelter Arbitration, the United States was damaged by fumes and 
industrial pollution emanating from Canadian businesses across the 
border.31 The tribunal concluded that Canada was responsible for the 
harm caused by the Trail Smelter because “no State has the right to 
use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause 
injury . . . in or to the territory of another or the properties or 
persons therein . . . .”32 The Trail Smelter Case is considered one of 
the primary sources of the enduring doctrine of due diligence.33 
Due diligence is the most commonly applied standard for the 
state’s duty to prevent trans-boundary harm.34 It is a robust standard 
with widespread application in various fields of international law. The 
next section describes the history and the wide acceptance of the 
standard of due diligence. The specific contours of due diligence as 
applied to cybercrime will then be developed and elaborated upon. 
A. Due diligence is a well-established principle with a strong historical 
pedigree 
The standard of due diligence has a lengthy historical 
pedigree.35 Due diligence is based on the historic maxim of sic utere 
 
 29. Id. at 549. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (Trail Smelter Arb. Trib. 1941), 
http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_III/1905-1982.pdf. 
 32. Id. at 1965. 
 33. Mark A. Drumbl, Trail Smelter and the International Law Commission’s Work on 
State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts and State Liability, TRANSBOUNDARY 
HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, (Russell A. Miller ed., 2006) available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/faculty/links/chapter8drumbl.pdf.  
 34. Nevertheless, despite its important role, some have argued that due diligence as a 
standard has received inadequate scholarly coverage. See, e.g., Gabe Shawn Varges, Book 
Review, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 568 (1991) (reviewing RICARDO PISILLO MAZZESCHI, ‘DUE 
DILIGENCE’ E RESPONSABILITÀ INTERNAZIONALE DEGLI STATI (Dott. A. Giuffrè ed., 1989)). 
This Comment is an attempt to add to that discourse. 
 35. One sign of the widespread permanence of the concept of due diligence is that the 
English term is commonly used even when the concept is discussed in countries with languages 
that have equivalent or analogous terms in the native tongue. See Varges, supra note 34 (for 
instance, diligence requise in French and diligenza dovuta in Italian). 
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tuo ut alienum non laedas and has its origin in Roman law.36 Due 
diligence was a central concern in early efforts to codify rules of 
state responsibility.37 Even though codification efforts have failed, 
there is a general consensus that the obligation of due diligence is 
part of the “corpus of general international law.”38 Despite the lack 
of general codification, due diligence has been applied in many 
fields, ranging from international environmental law,39 and efforts 
to prevent violence against women,40 but it applies to all areas of 
international law.41 
Likewise, due diligence has played a prominent role in important 
international law decisions. An arbitration in 1902 over economic 
losses suffered by an Italian citizen in Venezuela held that “if . . . it 
is . . . proved that Venezuelan authorities failed to exercise due 
diligence to prevent damages from being inflicted by revolutionists, 
that country should be held responsible.42 In 1924, after the 
assassination of an Italian general and other officials in Greece 
(Janina-Corfu affair), a Commission of Jurists appointed by the 
League of Nations explained that a state is responsible for harm 
committed against foreigners “if the state has neglected to take all 
reasonable measures for the prevention of the crime.”43 The 
Commission also recognized a concomitant obligation to pursue 
perpetrators and ensure that they are brought to justice. 
 
 36. So use your own as not to injure another’s property. See Jutta Brunnée, Sic utere tuo ut 
alienum non laedas, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010). 
 37. Timo Koivurova, Due Diligence, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010). 
 38. Id. 
 39. A wide range of environmental treaties incorporate the standard of due diligence. 
See PATRICIA BIRNIE, ALAN BOYLE & CATHERINE REDGWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE 
ENVIRONMENT 147–50 (2009). 
 40. Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences, Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, COMM’N ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/49 (May 14, 2013) (by Rashida Manjoo), 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session23/A_HR
C_23_49_English.pdf. 
 41.  Koivurova, supra note 37 (“[I]n international law the concept of due diligence 
remains a general principle of law.”).  
 42. Salvatore Sambiaggio (It. v. Venez.), 10 R.I.A.A. 499 (Mixed Claims Comm’n, 
1902) (emphasis added).  
 43. David Jayne Hill, The Janina-Corfu Affair, 18 AM. J. INT’L L. 98 (1924). See also 
Quincy Wright, Opinion of Commission of Jurists on Janina-Corfu Affair, 18 AM. J. INT’L L. 
536 (1924).  
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Other international courts have also invoked the standard of due 
diligence. For instance, the ICJ determined in 1979 that the 
government of Iran had failed to take “appropriate steps” to protect 
the United States consulate, and that its failure “was due to more 
than mere negligence or lack of appropriate means.”44 While the ICJ 
did not explicitly mention due diligence, the concept is implicit in 
language referring to “appropriate steps.”45 Likewise, in Nicaragua 
v. United States, the ICJ held that Nicaragua would not be held to a 
“higher degree of diligence” to control arms traffic than wealthier 
nations such as the United States.46 Implicit in the court’s analysis is 
that states do owe some degree of diligence in responding to and 
preventing trans-boundary harm. 
Thus, the existence of a due diligence obligation to prevent 
trans-boundary harm is well attested in customary international law 
and international legal precedent. The next section will flesh out the 
contours of a state’s due diligence obligation. 
B. What duty of care is required under due diligence? 
One of the challenges in regard to due diligence is determining 
exactly what standard of duty of care is required of states. 
Compounding this difficultly is the existence of slightly different 
conceptions of due diligence in different fields of international law. 
For instance, many of the specific contours of due diligence have 
developed in specialized fields such as international environmental 
law47 and human rights law48 (especially in the effort to prevent 
violence against women), and may not always be generally applicable 
or widely accepted. Nevertheless, the many references to due 
 
 44. U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 63 (May 24). 
 45. Due diligence is implicit because appropriate steps implies that there is some 
minimal degree of conduct required of states. Some have suggested that the absence of the 
phrase “due diligence” can be attributed to fact that due diligence serves as a “generic notion” 
of responsibility which finds varied expression in different fields of international law. 
Tzevelekos, supra note 14. While this Comment attempts to argue that a general standard of 
due diligence can be synthesized, this may be why the exact phrase “due diligence” is absent 
even when implied. 
 46. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) [hereinafter the Nicaragua case]. The Nicaragua case will also be 
discussed later in the context of factors that impact the degree of diligence demanded of a 
state. See infra text accompanying notes 68–69. See also Koivurova, supra note 37. 
 47. See BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 39. 
 48. See infra notes 82–88 and accompanying text.  
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diligence in these disparate fields suggest a general standard that can 
be applied in the trans-boundary cybercrime context.49 This section 
will explore the standard of due diligence and attempt to synthesize 
the various obligations. 
In subsection 1, I will consider what kinds of trans-boundary 
harm trigger a state’s due diligence obligation. Next, subsection 2 
will discuss the degree of care required under the standard of due 
diligence. Subsection 3 will look into the specific state obligations, 
specifically the duties to prevent, protect, prosecute, and redress.50 
Throughout, specific applicability of these standards in the 
cybercrime context will also be considered. 
1. Triggers for trans-boundary harm 
According to the United Nations’ International Law 
Commission (ILC), harmful conduct qualifies as trans-boundary 
harm when four criteria are met: First, the activity in question must 
be human activity. Second, it must be within the territory or control 
of one state. Third, it must give rise to harm or be capable of giving 
rise to harm. Fourth, that harm must be to persons or things within 
another state.51 
For cybercrime, human activity should be viewed quite broadly. 
A broad view of human activity is necessary because of the potential 
for self-replicating or spreading viruses or bots.52 If continuous 
human control were required before due diligence applied, state 
responsibility would be drastically limited. It would also provide an 
exploitable loophole for a state hoping to escape liability. Instead, 
cybercrime should qualify as human activity if the programming or 
activity has a human origin. This broad definition of human activity 
 
 49. Even though a general standard can be synthesized from disparate cases and 
references to due diligence, drafting and ratifying a comprehensive convention on cybercrime 
would be helpful in solidifying the exact obligations of a state. Thus, the existence of a general 
standard should encourage efforts to create specific international agreements and norms. See 
Tzevelekos, supra note 14.  
 50. Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences, The 
Due Diligence Standard as a Tool for the Elimination of Violence against Women, Comm’n on 
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/61 (Jan. 20, 2006) (by Yakin Ertürk). 
 51. Daniel Barstow Magraw, Transboundary Harm: The International Law Commission’s 
Study of “International Liability”, 80 AM. J. INT’L L., 305, 310 (1986). 
 52. Stuxnet was a self-replicating virus for instance, and spread far beyond the originally 
intended target. See Gary D. Brown, Why Iran Didn’t Admit Stuxnet Was an Attack, 63 JOINT 
FORCE QUARTERLY 70 (2011). 
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is consistent with the ILC’s wording, which was mainly understood 
to exclude natural disasters and other acts of nature.53 
In regard to cybercrime, one of the more difficult questions is 
whether a cybercrime occurs under the control of a state. For 
instance, if a cybercrime originates in territories that are indirectly 
controlled by Russia such as Chechnya or Crimea, it is not certain 
what degree of control the state has. However, the obligation of due 
diligence is incumbent upon each nation regardless of whether that 
nation has sufficient control to fully prevent the cybercrimes from 
occurring.54 A state is responsible for doing what is actually within its 
power; for instance, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
found Moldova and Russia responsible for its failure to exercise due 
diligence “even in the absence of effective control” to prevent an 
arbitrary detention. 55 Under the European Convention, Moldova 
and Russia had the responsibility to “take the diplomatic, economic, 
judicial or other measures that it is in its power to take . . . .”56 Thus, 
the international and diffused nature of cyber activities does not 
justify laxity on the part of states. While it may be difficult to 
determine the point of origin of an attack, a state is still responsible 
for making efforts to prevent trans-boundary harm caused by those 
residing in its territory or through its cyber infrastructure. 
The ILC’s third criterion is that the conduct must give rise to 
harm or be capable of giving rise to harm. The requirement “that 
harm must be to persons or things within another state” is an 
expansive one. Because harm can be to things, that would include 
servers, files, or other hardware damages as a result of a cyber attack. 
However, one possible limitation on the scope of what qualifies as 
trans-boundary harm might be a requirement that the harm result in 
physical consequences.57 For instance, under the Draft Articles on 
Prevention of Trans-boundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, 
conduct for which states are responsible extends to “any activity which 
involves the risk of causing significant transboundary harm through 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. See Tzevelekos, supra note 14, at 225. 
 55. Ilașcu v. Moldova, 2004 Eur. Ct. H.R., 318 at ¶ 331.  
 56. While Ilașcu focused on human rights violations under the European Convention, 
there is nothing in the decision that implies that the principle be limited only to violations of 
human rights.  
 57. See Magraw, supra note 51. 
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the physical consequences.”58 However, as the main focus of the Draft 
Articles is environmental harm, such a restriction may not be 
appropriate in the cyber context. Nevertheless, even with such a 
restriction, a great portion of cybercrime would qualify. It is arguable 
that altering code or causing a site to crash as a result of a DDoS 
attack59 has physical consequences.60 And certainly, a cybercrime that 
cripples critical governmental or civilian infrastructure would have 
dramatic physical consequences that extend beyond the realm of 
economic impact. Additionally, the harm need not be exclusively 
trans-boundary or exclusively impact those in another state.61 Given 
the interconnected nature of the cyber economy, a cyber-attack might 
have consequences in both the country of origin and the target 
country. Such attacks would qualify as causing trans-boundary harm.62 
In addition to the aforementioned requirements, in order for a 
state to be responsible for third party trans-boundary harm, the harm 
caused must be more than de minimus; the harm must be 
“significant.”63 Significant harm would include harm that is more than 
merely “detectible” and could be measured by objective standards 
including economic loss.64 However, for harm to qualify as significant 
it need not rise to the level of serious or substantial.65 Unfortunately, 
this distinction has not always been applied consistently. For instance, 
the Trail Smelter Arbitration relied on existing U.S. and international 
decisions to establish that the harm must be of serious consequence 
 
 58. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Apr. 
23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 2001); U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2008), 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_7_2001.pdf.  
 59.  DDoS attacks typically occur when an attack floods a network or website with 
information causing an overload that leads to slowdown or a crash. See US-CERT, Security Tip 
(ST04–015): Understanding Denial-of-Service Attacks (Feb. 06, 2013), https://www.us-
cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-015.  
 60. See Michael N. Schmitt, “Attack” as a Term of Art in International Law: The Cyber 
Operations Context, 2012 4TH INT’L CONF. ON CYBER CONFLICT (2012), available at 
http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/2012proceedings/5_2_Schmitt_AttackAsATermOfArt.
pdf (arguing that currently manipulation of data does not count as physical consequences to 
qualify as an armed attack, but that the proliferation of cyber-attacks might lead the standard 
to change). 
 61. See Magraw, supra note 51. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
A/56/10 International Law Commission (2001), art. 2 commentary (4). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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and be established by clear and convincing evidence.66 Nevertheless, 
cyber-attacks will regularly rise to the level of significant and, because 
of the staggering economic costs totaling in the millions or billons, 
may rise even to the level of having serious consequences. Certainly, 
the economic cost of Russian cyber-attacks on the U.S. rises to the 
level of having serious consequences. 
2. Reasonableness 
Due diligence is a standard of reasonableness, and therefore is 
assessed based on the standard of conduct expected of a reasonable 
government.67 Due diligence is an “obligation of conduct rather than 
of result.”68 Thus, in assessing whether a state exercised due 
diligence, the focus is on what the state did or did not do to prevent 
cybercrime rather than whether its attempts succeeded.69 
A range of factors, such as the degree of effective territorial 
control, resources available to a state, and the nature of specific 
activities are considered when determining what degree of diligence 
is required by a state.70 In addition, the degree of risk is a vital 
consideration, with ultra-hazardous activities requiring a far higher 
standard of care and greater state diligence.71 One historic example 
of the interplay of some of these factors is the ICJ’s decision in the 
 
 66. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (Trail Smelter Arb. Trib. 
1941), http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_III/1905-1982.pdf. 
 67. See Koivurova, supra note 37, at ¶ 16. 
 68. David Freestone, Advisory Opinion of the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on ‘Responsibilities and Obligations of States 
Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, 15 AMER. SOC. INT. L. 
(March 2011), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/15/issue/7/advisory-
opinion-seabed-disputes-chamber-international-tribunal-law-sea-#_ednref10. 
 69.  By a focus on efforts rather than results, I mean that a state will be judged based on 
whether adequate measures are in place to prevent a type of trans-boundary harm, rather than 
on whether those efforts were successful in preventing a particular harm. Thus, if a state has in 
place adequate measures to guard against trans-boundary cybercrime, it will not be responsible 
if a particular attack occurs despite its diligent efforts to prevent it.  
 70. The ICJ considered these factors in its decision in the Nicaragua case when it 
considered that the United States with its wealth had been unable to stem the flow of arms, 
and so it was unreasonable to expect far-less-prosperous Nicaragua to do so. See also supra note 
69 and accompanying text. 
 71. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, Prevention of 
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, U.N. GAOR 53d Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. 
Doc. A/56/10, at 394 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 148, 154, U. N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) (art. 3 cmt. 11), available at 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/56/a5610.pdf. 
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Nicaragua case. In that case, the ICJ applied and weighed the 
above factors against the risk created by the arms-traffic problem, 
and determined that the poorer state of Nicaragua could not be 
held responsible for failing to control the arms-traffic problem that 
its far-wealthier neighbors in the north could not even control 
despite superior resources.72 The court also noted that Nicaragua 
had limited control of the flow of arms by “traditional smugglers” 
in Nicaraguan coastal areas and therefore could not expected to 
prevent all smuggling.73 
Several other mitigating factors might also limit the degree of 
diligence a state is required to exercise. For instance, in the context 
of efforts to prevent violence against women, the ECtHR, has 
acknowledged some additional factors that play into assessing 
whether a state exercised reasonable due diligence. The ECtHR has 
suggested that a state’s due-diligence obligation may be constrained 
by factors such as the “unpredictability of human conduct and 
operational choices which must be made terms of priorities and 
resources.”74 The ECtHR has also acknowledged a great degree of 
state discretion within the “margin of appreciation”75 regarding 
appropriate legislative and judicial solutions.76 Some have suggested 
that this test closely resembles the test of proportionality often used 
by the ECtHR in other contexts.77 Thus, an inquiry into due 
 
 72. See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 154 (June 27); see also Koivurova supra note 
37, at ¶ 40. 
 73.  Id. at ¶ 155.  
 74. Makaratzis v. Greece, App. No. 50385/99, 2004 Eur. Ct. H.R.; See also Lee 
Hasselbacher, State Obligations Regarding Domestic Violence: The European Court of Human 
Rights, Due Diligence, and International Legal Minimums of Protection, 8 NW. J. INT’L HUM. 
RTS. 190, at ¶ 39–40 (2010).  
 75. The notion of a margin of appreciation in the cyber context is worthy of further 
exploration. Taken to an extreme, it is a concept that can easily be abused. Certainly, the 
concept of a margin of appreciation cannot justify using the excuse of combating cybercrime as 
a pretext for censorship or aggressive violations of human rights, such as freedom of expression 
or freedom of religion. Nevertheless, when assessing whether a state’s attempts to stop 
cybercrime are reasonable, unique national factors should be considered and weighed.  
 76. See Hasselbacher, supra note 74, at ¶ 36. 
 77. See Tzevelekos, supra note 14, at 203–04. Tzevelekns discusses the relationship 
between the margin of appreciation and the proportionality test in his article. He states that 
after the “ court reaches regarding the extent of positive state obligations will undergo one last 
test, carried out at the macro, or generic, level of the due diligence principle. The baseline for 
this test is that the state has at its disposal the necessary means for providing the measures that 
have been considered reasonable in a given case.” Id. at 204. He suggests that the margin of 
discretion that comes in depends upon the means of the state and other factors. Id. 
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diligence take into account other challenges a state faces as well as 
unique efforts that the state adopts to combat trans-boundary harm. 
To determine whether a state has acted with due diligence in the 
context of cybercrime, one should consider the degree of 
technological development in a country (as a measure of wealth), 
and the degree to which the state has control over cyber 
infrastructure. The seriousness of potential cyber-attacks would also 
determine the expected degree of diligence. Accordingly, a state 
might be expected to spend much more energy combating cyber 
terrorism or large-scale organized activity than sporadic and less-
dangerous activities perpetuated by isolated individuals. 
Because due diligence relies on a standard of reasonableness, it 
has been criticized for providing little guidance on what specific 
legislation or actions a state must take;78 nevertheless, the standard 
provides a degree of flexibility that is necessary as states attempt to 
combat intricate and complex modern problems. Importantly, the 
existence of the standard of due diligence implies that there is a level 
of minimally expected diligence by a state.79 Moreover, a concurrent 
implication is that the standard is an evolving one requiring 
continuing improvements on the part of states. Indeed, due 
diligence has been described as a variable concept that changes over 
time and increasingly demands more of states in light of new 
scientific or technological knowledge.80 
As states continue to develop technological capabilities, the 
standard of diligence for protecting and preventing cyber-attacks and 
cybercrime should continue to increase.81 New scientific or 
technological knowledge regarding cyber-weapons should lead to 
increased capacity to prevent trans-boundary cybercrime. Over time, 
 
 78. BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 39. Indeed, due diligence has been accused of being 
simply a tautology and not a standard. Yet because the standard is an objective one based on 
the conduct of nations, generally, it can best be seen as an effort to “objectivize” fault rather 
than merely stating wishful thinking. See Gabe Shawn Varges, ‘Due Diligence’ e Responsabilita 
Internazionale Degli Stati by Riccardo Pisillo Mazzeschi, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 568 (1991) 
(attempts to give some “teeth” to the standard of due diligence). 
 79. Tzevelekos, supra note 14. 
 80. DONALD K. ANTON ET AL., ADVISORY OPINION ON RESPONSIBILITY AND 
LIABILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL SEABED MINING (ITLOS CASE NO. 17): INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN THE SEABED DISPUTES CHAMBER (2011), available at 
https://www.academia.edu/669708/Advisory_Opinion_on_Responsibility_and_Liability_for
_International_Seabed_Mining_ITLOS_Case_No._17_International_Environmental_Law_in_t
he_Seabed_Disputes_Chamber. 
 81. Id. 
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the standard of care expected of states should increase rather than 
decrease as cyber-threats become more sophisticated and dangerous. 
As will be discussed further, states have an obligation to continually 
improve technological capabilities to respond to cybercrime.82 
3. Specific requirements of conduct 
Although states have an obligation to monitor and prevent trans-
boundary harm, many have persuasively argued that there is a 
broader obligation to “prevent, protect, prosecute, and redress” 
cybercrime.83 Merely monitoring and preventing is insufficient absent 
adequate police action and adequate prosecution to deter subsequent 
crime.84 Likewise, without redress, such as access to civil courts or 
other remedial schemes, states fail to remedy the consequences of 
trans-boundary harm.85 For a state to adequately and diligently 
respond to trans-boundary harm caused by its citizens, each of these 
components should be required.86 
Thus, due diligence can be seen as an affirmative obligation 
requiring a state to do more than merely respond to harm already 
caused. States must take “preventive measures” or, at the very least, 
minimize the impact of trans-boundary harm.87 Where states are 
unable to fully prevent harm, there is still a duty to minimize the risk 
of such harm. 
Before delving into the specific requirements of state conduct 
under due diligence, it is helpful to look at an example of how this 
 
 82. See infra text accompanying note 96. 
 83. Special Rapporteur on the Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences, 
Integration of the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: Violence Against 
Women, ¶ 29, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/61 (Jan. 20, 2006) (by 
Yakin Ertürk). The ILC proposed a slightly different but similar framework of four 
“compound obligations” to prevent, inform, negotiate, and repair. Given that the ILC was 
focused on harmful acts that are not illegal, the absence of a prosecutorial component is 
expected. Still, the similarities suggest a general agreement that something more than mere 
prevention is required. See Magraw, supra note 51, at 311. 
 84.  See infra Part III.B.3.a–c.  
 85.  See infra Part III.B.3.d. 
 86. Of course, there is considerable overlap between concepts such as prevention and 
protection. Classification of one approach as either preventive or protective is made on the 
judgment of the author. As the concept of due diligence is applied holistically, categorization 
of any particular measure is not essential. 
 87. Koivurova, supra note 37; see also Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary 
Harm from Hazardous Activities, in Report of the International Law Commission A/56/10, 
at 153 (art. 3 cmt. 3) (2001). 
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standard has been enforced in other contexts.88 Hungary violated the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women when it failed to “act with due diligence to prevent 
violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence, and 
for providing compensation.”89 In reaching its conclusion, the 
committee considered three factors: lack of adequate legislation to 
ensure prevention of harm,90 lack of priority given to the prosecution 
of violators,91 and the failure of the state to provide information as to 
possible alternative avenues to ensure adequate vindication of legal 
rights.92 In a case involving Brazil, the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights similarly found a “general pattern of negligence 
and lack of effective action by the state in prosecuting and convicting 
aggressors,” as well as general “judicial ineffectiveness.”93 The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights has also explained that it could 
hold states responsible for failing to punish violators and to provide 
victims needed assistance in recovery.94 
Thus, in holding states responsible for failing to exercise due 
diligence, courts have looked holistically at each of the four areas.95 
 
 88. As previously mentioned, many of the cases elaborating on what the standard of due 
diligence requires in each of these areas arise in the context of state efforts to prevent violence 
against women. Others arise in the international environmental context. While all of these 
cases are not perfect fits for the cyber context, they provide the framework for a standard of 
care that is increasingly becoming customary law. 
 89. Views of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women under 
Article 7, Paragraph 3, of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, Rep. on its 32nd Sess., Jan. 10–28, 2005, U.N. Doc. A/60/38 (Part I), at 37 ¶ 9.2 
(2005) [hereinafter A.T. v. Hungary]. The case involved a woman who had been physically 
abused for a period of four years. Hungarian state law was deemed inadequate to address her 
human rights violations. 
 90. Id. at ¶ 9.3 (“[T]he Committee notes that the State party [Hungary] has 
admitted . . . that legal and institutional arrangements in the State party are not yet ready to 
ensure the internationally expected, coordinated, comprehensive and effective protection and 
support for the victims of domestic violence.”). Note that the committee reached this 
conclusion even though pending legislation might have changed the situation. 
 91. Id. (“The Committee further notes the State party’s general assessment that 
domestic violence cases as such do not enjoy high priority in court proceedings.”). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Maria da Penha v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 
54/01, OEA/Ser./L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. ¶ 56 (2001). 
 94. Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Decisions and Judgments, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 176 (July 29, 1988). 
 95. In doing so, I hope to provide an overview and bring together disparate extant 
strands of analysis. Such an effort is necessarily not comprehensive. Each of these areas 
deserves more extensive analysis than can be accomplished in this Comment.  
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a. Prevent 
One of the most significant requirements of prevention is the 
responsibility to adopt laws and policies appropriate for ensuring 
compliance.96 It is insufficient for a state to disclaim responsibility by 
relying on inadequate existing domestic laws.97 As mentioned, in the 
Hungary case, the lack of “specific legislation” to combat the harm 
was seen as deeply problematic. The state was liable for the lack of 
laws even though it “instituted a comprehensive action programme 
against domestic violence” and a wide range of pending legislation to 
deal with the problem.98 Moreover, as the Hungary example 
illustrates, generic criminal laws may also be inadequate. Thus, a 
state is required to put in “place effective criminal-law provisions to 
deter the commission of offenses.”99 
Likewise, in its advisory opinion on Responsibility and Liability for 
International Seabed Mining, the International Tribunal for the Law 
of the Sea provided three principles underlying obligations to prevent 
trans-boundary environmental harm which can also serve (with some 
modification) as principles for preventing against trans-boundary 
cyber-attacks and cybercrime: a precautionary approach, best 
[environmental] practices, and [environmental] impact assessments.100 
A precautionary approach implies a proactive approach to 
preventing trans-boundary harm.101 States cannot rely on uncertainty 
to fail to take necessary steps. Instead, states should act upon 
“plausible indications of potential risk.”102 Best practices would 
 
 96. U.S. v. Gr. Brit., 29 R.I.A.A. 125, 125–34 (1871), available at 
http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXIX/125-134.pdf. 
 97. A.T. v. Hungary, supra, note 89. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Osman v. U.K. App. No. 23452/94, 1998 Eur. Ct. H.R.. See also Hasselbacher, 
supra, note 74; Tzevelekos, supra note 14. 
 100. Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 
Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to 
Activities in the Area, Advisory Opinion (Feb. 1, 2011), available at 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_17/adv_op_010211.pdf. 
Other obligations listed in the opinion are less relevant in the cyber context or specific to the 
Law of the Sea: “the obligation to assist the Authority in the exercise of control over activities 
in the Area” “the obligation to take measures to ensure the provision of guarantees in the 
event of an emergency order by the Authority for protection of the marine environment,” and 
“the obligation to ensure the availability of recourse for compensation in respect of damage 
caused by pollution.” Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. ¶ 131.  
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require states to use the “best technology available” in developing 
and implementing protocols to prevent cyber-attacks and 
cybercrime.103 Impact assessment would require that a state consider 
the impacts of its cyber policies and internet policies on the 
proliferation of cybercrime and cyber-attacks. States should also 
regularly evaluate their progress in preventing cybercrimes. Each of 
these should be a component of a state’s efforts to prevent trans-
boundary cybercrime. 
Finally, some additional requirements for preventing trans-
boundary cyber harm might include promoting research and data 
collection to understand the scope of the problem, and drawing up 
action plans.104 
b. Protect 
Due diligence requires not merely the adoption of laws, but also 
“a certain level of vigilance in their enforcement.”105 Even adequate 
legislation is insufficient if not “backed up by law-enforcement 
machinery for the prevention, suppression and sanctioning of 
breaches of such provisions.”106 
States are also required to ensure that sufficient institutional 
capacity exists to diligently respond to alleged crimes and effectively 
monitor for trans-boundary harm. In order to do so, adequate 
training is required to ensure that law enforcement personnel are 
equipped to respond to violations of the law.107 In the cybercrime 
context, this might involve ensuring that there are individuals in 
various governmental agencies with the adequate technological 
training. This would also include conducting official investigations in 
response to alleged violations.108 
Another component of both prevention and protection would 
involve co-operation with other states in response to acts causing 
trans-boundary harm. In the Pulp Mills judgment, a dispute between 
Argentina and Uruguay over construction on the Uruguay River, the 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. UNECE, Convention of the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, Volume 
2105, I-36605 Annex IV. 4, available at http://www2.unitar.org/cwm/publications/cbl/syn
ergy/pdf/cat3/unece/trans_effect_ind_accidents/convention_trans_ind_en.pdf.  
 105. Pulp Mills Case (Arg. v. Uru.), 2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶197 (April 20). 
 106. R.R. v. Hungary, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2001 at ¶ 28 (2012). 
 107. Id. 
 108. M.C. v. Bulgaria, 2003 Eur. Ct. H.R. 651 at ¶¶ 148–66.  
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ICJ explained that cooperation between the parties was “necessary in 
order to fulfill the obligation of prevention.”109 The Draft Articles on 
Prevention of Trans-boundary Harm from Hazardous Activities 
explains this obligation as follows: “States concerned shall cooperate 
in good faith and, as necessary, seek the assistance of one or more 
competent international organizations in preventing significant 
trans-boundary harm or at any event in minimizing the risk 
thereof.”110 Likewise, regarding international co-operation, the 
Palermo Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, to which 
Russia is a signatory, requires states to provide each other “the 
widest measure of mutual legal assistance.”111 States are also 
forbidden from refusing to provide such assistance on the ground 
that an offense merely “involve[s] fiscal matters.”112 
c. Prosecute 
States are obligated to make prosecution of trans-boundary 
crimes a priority. In the aforementioned Hungary case, the court 
found Hungary in violation of its due diligence obligation in part 
because prosecutions of violence against women did “not enjoy high 
priority in court proceedings.”113 Commentary on the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea emphasizes that due 
diligence imposes on states a positive obligation to ensure that their 
legal system adequately forbids and punishes prohibited conduct.114 
The prosecution of crimes should provide sufficient deterrence to 
help prevent additional violations.115 
 
 109. Pulp Mills Case (Arg. V. Uru.), 2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶102 (April 20). 
 110. Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, [with 
commentary], in Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-third Session, UN GAOR, 
56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 148–70, U.N. DOC. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles]. 
 111. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the 
Protocols Thereto [hereinafter Palermo Convention], art. 18, 2004, available at 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/
TOCebook-e.pdf. 
 112. Id. at art. 16 sub. 15. 
 113. A.T. v. Hungary, supra note 89, at ¶ 9.3. 
 114. David Freestone, Advisory Opinion of the Seabed Disputes Chamber of International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on ‘Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons 
and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area,’ AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INT’L LAW (March 
2011), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/15/issue/7/advisory-opinion-
seabed-disputes-chamber-international-tribunal-law-sea-#_ednref10. 
 115. See Osman v. U.K., supra note 99. 
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In evaluating whether prosecutions are adequate, the overall 
pattern of prosecutions should be considered. It is insufficient to 
occasionally prosecute violators; what is needed is sustained and 
regular enforcement and prosecution. For instance, with Brazil, the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found that the 
“general pattern of negligence and lack of effective action by the 
state in prosecuting and convicting aggressors [of violence against 
women],” as well as general “judicial ineffectiveness,” constituted a 
violation of the state’s obligation.116 
Another component of prosecutions of cybercrimes should 
involve developing protocols for extradition of criminals. Extradition 
and cooperation in prosecution have been integral to international 
efforts at combating cybercrime.117 Some have argued that states are 
obligated by customary international law to either prosecute or 
extradite criminals. Zdzislaw Galicki, a member of the United 
Nations International Law Commission has described this as “a right 
recognized in international law and even considered by some jurists 
as jus cogens”.118 Thus, states should make a good faith effort to 
cooperate with the extradition of suspected cybercriminals. 
d. Redress 
States are also required to assist victims of trans-boundary harm. 
Of all of the state responsibilities outlined, the responsibility to 
provide redress is the least well-defined as a matter of customary law. 
In most circumstances, redress is determined based on specific 
agreements narrowly tailored to certain kinds of trans-boundary 
 
 116. Maria da Penha v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Rept. No. 54/01, 
¶ 56, (1998). 
 117. See Andy Greenberg, Cybercops Without Borders, FORBES (June 1, 2009), 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/01/cyberbusts-security-internet-technology-security-
cyberbusts.html; Mark Clayton, Hacker’s Extradition for Cyber Heist: Sign U.S. is Gaining in 
Cyber Crime Fight, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Aug. 11, 2010), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2010/0811/Hacker-s-extradition-for-cyber-heist-
sign-US-is-gaining-in-cyber-crime-fight. 
 118. Zdzislaw Galicki, The Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute (“aut dedere aut judicare”)  
in International Law: Preliminary Remarks (2004), available at 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/reports/2004/english/annex.pdf; See also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION: THE OBLIGATION TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE (AUT 
DEDERE AUT JUDICARE (2009), available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR40/001/2009/en/a4761626-f20a-11dd-855f-
392123cb5f06/ior400012009en.pdf 
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harm.119 However, there are ongoing efforts to develop articles on 
state liability for damages to supplement the ILC’s articles on State 
Responsibility,120 and scholars have attempted to elaborate on state 
responsibility to offer redress.121 
Some have suggested that states can fulfill their responsibility to 
provide redress in numerous ways. A state could follow a minimalist 
“access to justice” approach,122 which would allow non-state actors full 
access to courts and the recourse of national laws.123 The courts would 
have to have “necessary jurisdiction and competence.”124 The civil law 
of a state should allow victims to sue and recover damages.125 
Alternatively, a state could offer a “compensation approach” to 
providing redress by offering direct aid to those that suffer as a result 
of trans-boundary harm.126 This compensation could take on a 
variety of different forms. For instance, the Draft Principles on the 
Allocation of Loss suggests that states could require the 
establishment of “industry-wide funds at the national level.”127 Other 
forms of compensation might rely on public or private insurance.128 
Regardless of the approach taken, the non-discrimination 
principle would govern all efforts to provide redress.129 States would 
be required to offer the same level of assistance in helping trans-
boundary victims as they do to their own nationals. The Draft 
Principles on the Allocation of Loss also suggest that international 
 
 119. Worku Damena Yifru, Kathryn Garforth & Paola Sacrone, Review of Issues, 
Instruments and Practices Relevant to Liability and Redress for Damage Resulting from 
Transboundary Movement of Living Modified Organisms, SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION 
ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (2012), available at 
http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/cpb_technicalseries/cpb-ts-03-en.pdf. 
 120. Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the case of Transboundary Harm Arising 
out of Hazardous Activities [hereinafter Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss], UN General 
Assembly Resolution 61/36 ANNEX, UN DOC. A/RES/61/36 (18 Dec. 2006). 
 121. A.E. Boyle, Globalising Environmental Liability: The Interplay of National and 
International Law, 17 J. ENV. L. 3 (2005); see also Caroline Foster, The ILC Draft Principles 
on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous 
Activities, 14 RECIEL (3) (2005).  
 122. Boyle, supra note 121, at 9. 
 123. Id.  
 124. Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss, supra note 120. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Boyle, supra note 121. 
 127. Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss, supra note 120. 
 128. Id. at Principle 4. 
 129. Boyle, supra note 121.  
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cooperation should be an integral component of redress efforts.130 
The state is expected to “consult with and seek the cooperation of all 
States affected or likely to be affected to mitigate the effects of 
transboundary damage.”131 
In addition, redress should be “prompt and adequate.” The ILC 
in its comment on the Draft Principles of the Allocation of Loss 
based this standard on the Trail Smelter decision arguing that “the 
basic principle established in that case entailed a duty of a State to 
ensure payment of prompt and adequate compensation for any 
transboundary damage.”132 In the accompanying commentary, this 
standard was elaborated upon to mean compensation that is 
“predictable, equitable, expeditious and cost effective.”133 While 
there is ongoing debate as to whether this is a “soft law” principle, 
or an obligatory element,134 it is at the very least an emerging 
international norm.135 
In the cyber-law context, under an access of justice approach 
states would be required to allow for either effective civil litigation 
against those that perpetuate cyber-attacks or offer direct 
compensation as part of criminal prosecution. A compensation 
approach could take on a variety of forms. A state might help to 
rebuild or repair sites that are taken down by cyber-attacks. States 
might also offer compensation for time that a site is down as a result 
of cyber-attacks or other forms of economic redress. Either of these 
approaches, if undertaken with adequate diligence, could meet a 
state’s international obligation to provide redress. 
IV. RUSSIA AS A PARTY TO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
In addition to Russia’s basic obligation of due diligence, Russia is 
a signatory to international agreements that further solidify its 
responsibility to combat organized cybercrime.136 In May 2004, Russia 
 
 130. Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss, supra note 120, at Principle 6. 
 131. Id. at Principle 5. 
 132. Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-Sixth Session, 197 (May–Aug. 2004). 
 133. Id. at 185.  
 134. The ILC suggests that compensation might be obligatory (“the basic principle 
established in that case entailed a duty of state to ensure payment of prompt and adequate 
compensation for any transboundary damage.”). Id. at 197. 
 135. Boyle, supra note 121, at 17. 
 136. Committee of Experts on Terrorism, Cyberterrorism – The Use of the Internet for 
Terrorist Purposes, Russian Federation (Oct. 2007), available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/Source/cyberterrorism/Russian%20Federation.pdf. 
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signed on to the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime (also called the Palermo convention because it was 
signed in Palermo, Italy).137 Signatories committed to create laws 
necessary to criminalize and punish not just illegal criminal activities of 
organized groups, but also conspiracies in such organized groups.138 
The convention also requires states to ensure that bribery and 
corruption are adequately punished and to “adopt legislative, 
administrative, or other effective measures to promote integrity and to 
prevent, detect, and punish the corruption of public officials.”139 
Article 13 of the convention also requires states to cooperate to 
prevent trans-boundary criminal activity and to respond by taking 
measures to “identify, trace and freeze or seize proceeds of crime, 
property, equipment or other instrumentalities . . . .”140 Signatory 
states are also bound to provide each other with “the widest measure 
of mutual legal assistance,” and states cannot refuse to provide such 
assistance on the ground that an offense merely “involve[s] fiscal 
matters.”141 Another relevant provision requires states to take measures 
to encourage those that have participated in the criminal activities of 
organized groups to cooperate with the authorities.142 
On the other hand, Russia has refused to sign the Council of 
Europe Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest Convention). 
Publically, Russia has justified its objections by pointing to provisions 
of the convention dealing with unilateral trans-border access of 
computer data, which it claims would violate its sovereignty.143 
However, some have argued that Russia’s refusal to sign really stems 
 
 137. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, (Status as of 
June 12, 2014). available at 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-
12&chapter=18&lang=en. The Palermo Convention defines “Organized criminal group” as “a 
structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert 
with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance 
with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material 
benefit[.]” Palermo Convention, supra note 111, at Article 2, (a). 
 138. Palermo Convention, supra note 111, at Article 6(1)(b)(ii).  
 139. Id. at Article 9(1). 
 140. Id. at Article 13(2). 
 141. Id. at Article 18(1). 
 142. Id. at Article 26. 
 143. Maria Lewytzkyj, Tactics in Cybersecurity: Russia & US – Don’t Forget the Council of 
Europe Cyber-Crime Convention, EXAMINER.COM (July 1, 2009), 
http://www.examiner.com/article/tactics-cybersecurity-russia-us-don-t-forget-the-council-of-
europe-cyber-crime-convention. 
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from an unwillingness to take upon itself “an obligation to assist 
other nations in cybercrime investigations given the numerous cyber-
attacks that emanate from Russia.”144 
Russia’s alternative proposal instead focuses on restricting 
internet conduct “aimed at undermining the political, economic, and 
social system of another government.”145 However, Russia’s proposal 
does not create any rules governing state responsibility to prevent 
and respond to cyber-attacks. Russian efforts have also been 
criticized for their focus on suppressing the free flow of information 
and resorting to excessive censorship.146 
Despite Russia’s refusal to sign on to the Budapest convention, 
the Palermo Convention still obligates Russia to work diligently to 
eradicate organized crime and associated corruption, which 
coincidently includes cybercrime. 
V. RUSSIAN EFFORTS TO COMBAT THE MAFIA AND CYBERCRIME: 
HALTING SUCCESS AMIDST FAILURE 
In Russia, organized crime has long proliferated. While Russia has 
made great strides in combating the Mafia in some areas, the 
government’s efforts seem to have led the Mafia to more heavily involve 
itself in cybercrime and particularly trans-boundary cybercrime.147 
The factors contributing to the growth of the Mafia have been 
thoroughly studied.148 In the late 1980s and 1990s, government 
efforts to transition to a market economy without a legal structure 
 
 144. Michael A. Vatis, The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, in PROCEEDINGS 
OF A WORKSHOP ON DETERRING CYBERATTACKS 207, 218 (Nat’l Research Council ed., 2010). 
 145. See Daniel Kennedy, Deciphering Russia: Russia’s Perspectives on Internet Policy and 
Governance, GLOBAL PARTNERS DIGITAL 9–10 (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.gp-
digital.org/wp-content/uploads/pubs/FINAL%20-%20Deciphering%20Russia.pdf. 
 146. Avner Levin, Securing Cyberspace: A Comparative Review of Stratagies Worldwide, 
TED ROGERS SCH. OF MGMT. - RYERSON U. 36 (July 2012), 
http://www.ryerson.ca/content/dam/tedrogersschool/privacy/documents/Ryerson_cyber_
crime_final_report.pdf. 
 147. For an overview of the Mafia’s shift from violent crime to blue-collar crime, see 
generally Vsevolod Sokolov, From Guns to Briefcases: The Evolution of Russian Organized 
Crime, 21 WORLD POL’Y J. 68, 72 (2004). See also Dan Kaplan, Russian Cyber Crime Market 
More Organized, Lucrative, SC MAGAZINE (April 24, 2012), available at 
http://www.scmagazine.com/russian-cyber-crime-market-more-organized-
lucrative/article/238100/ (describing the shift from a disorganized cyber crime underground 
to an organized and professionalized endeavor led by the Russian Mafia). 
 148. See, e.g., Sokolov, supra note 147; see also  James Ruth, The Russian Mob: Organized Crime in a 
Fledgling Democracy, AUBURN U., http://www.auburn.edu/~mitrege/FLRU2520/RussianOrganizedCri
me.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2014).  
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ready to enforce “transparency, accountability, and shareholders’ 
rights” proved fertile grounds for the growth of illicit activities.149 
Poverty and unemployment led many to become involved in 
organized crime organizations.150 Corrupt police officers accepted 
bribes and “looked the other way” as the Mafia engaged in criminal 
activity without fear of punishment.151 Judicial prosecutions failed to 
target high-level mafia officials, and even when small-time criminals 
were prosecuted, these criminals rarely faced jail time.152 The Mafia 
also manipulated the judicial system by various means such as 
bringing prosecutions in order to sabotage business competitors.153 
Indeed, the legal situation in Russia has been described as “legal 
nihilism.”154 In fact, in 2008, President Vladimir Putin acknowledged 
that fighting against corruption was “the most wearying and difficult 
(problem) to resolve.”155 
While Russia has spoken about the importance of combating 
“legal nihilism,” its rhetoric has mostly been followed by inaction.156 
Indeed, despite rhetoric opposing the actions of organized groups, 
the Russian Government has been accused of using organized crime 
to do “whatever the government of Russia cannot acceptably do as a 
government[,]” including criminal operations such as arms 
trafficking.157 Some have even suggested that Russia is virtually a 
“mafia state.”158 
 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. See also Williams infra note 225 and accompanying text. 
 153. Thomas Firestone, Armed Injustice: Abuse of the Law and Complex Crime in Post-
Soviet Russia, 38 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 555, 571 (2009–2010). 
 154. E. K. Matevosova, Legal Nihilism in Russia and Its Causes, 2011 CURRENT ISSUES 
RUSS. L. 22 (2011); see also Kathryn Hendley, Who are the Legal Nihlists in Russia?, 28 POST-
SOVIET AFF. 149 (2012). 
 155. Vladimir Putin, President of Russ., Remarks at Annual Big Press Conference (Feb. 
14, 2008) (transcript available at http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/02/14/101
1_type82915_160266.shtml). 
 156. John Barham, Russia’s Cybercrime Haven, SECURITY MGMT. (Nov. 1, 2008), 
https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/Russias-Cybercrime-Haven.aspx. 
 157. Luke Harding, WikiLeaks Cables: Russian Government ‘Using Mafia for its Dirty 
Work’, GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2010), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/01/wikileaks-cable-spain-russian-mafia. 
 158. Russia is Virtual ‘Mafia State,’ Says Spanish Investigator, GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 
2010), http://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/247712. 
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Despite these problems, some positive steps have been taken, 
including efforts to root out corruption in the police force.159 
Likewise, state efforts to stop money laundering by organized crime 
have been seen as very successful.160 Russia has also enacted several 
strong laws targeting corruption and money laundering,161 and 
prosecuted thousands of cases of corruption.162 One leading study 
also suggested that the so-called “bribe tax” declined between 2002 
and 2005,163 but the results have been mixed, as other studies 
suggest a steady growth in bribes that exceeds the rate of inflation.164 
Yet, other studies have measured an increase of overall corruption.165 
And regardless, it is nearly impossible to overstate how pervasive 
corruption continues to be,166 and Russian citizens continue to 
 
 159. Government Flexes Legal Muscle in Corruption in Russia Fight, THINK RUSSIA (June 
17, 2010), http://www.thinkrussia.com/policy-initiatives/government-flexes-legal-muscle-
corruption-russia-fight. 
 160. See Anti Money-Laundering Law is Enacted in Russia, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS 
TAX AND LEGAL FLASH REPORT (July 2013), available at http://www.pwc.ru/en/tax-
consulting-services/legislation/assets/tax-flash-report-issue-24-342-eng.pdf; but see Alexandra 
V. Orlova, Russia’s Anti-Money Laundering Regime: Law Enforcement Tool or Instrument of 
Domestic Control?, 11 J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 210 (2008). 
 161. See William D. Semins & Denise N. Yasinow, Russia Amends Anti-Corruption Law to 
Require Affirmative Anti-Corruption Compliance Measures, K & L GATES (May 8, 2013), 
http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/6e522369-093b-4d2d-bc07-
005d0fbb0860/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/3ca1d514-2937-4523-bda1-
03388b86bbec/Government_Enforcement_Alert_05022013.pdf. 
 162. In the first ten months of 2007 alone, 8,500 officials were charged and over 37,000 
cases of corruption were uncovered. 8,500 Russians Charged with Corruption: Official, 
EDMONTON J. (Nov. 22, 2007), at A4, http://www.canada.com/story.html?id=d0c04854-
743d-4f1e-8337-e7011423a2ab. 
 163. Michael Alexeev & Robert Conrad, Assessment of Tax Reform Results in Russia: 
Comparative Analysis 11 (Gaidar Inst. for Econ. Policy, Working Paper No. 0001, 2009), 
available at http://www.iep.ru/files/RePEc/gai/wpaper/0001Alexeev-Conrad.pdf. 
 164. See Alexandra Kalinina, Corruption in Russia as a Business, INSTITUTE OF MODERN 
RUSSIA (Jan. 2013), http://imrussia.org/en/society/376-corruption-in-russia-as-a-business. 
In addition, a team from the World Bank recently noted that those companies that are required 
to pay a bribe are increasingly expected to pay more. WORLD BANK, POLICY NOTE: RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION: NATIONAL AND REGIONAL TRENDS IN REGULATORY BURDEN AND 
CORRUPTION 5 (Feb. 2013), available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/eca/Russia-Regional-
BEEPS-2013.pdf. 
 165. Terry Miller et al., Index of Economic Freedom: Russia, HERITAGE FOUND. 365–66 
(2014), http://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2014/countries/russia.pdf. 
 166. PHILIP GOUNEV & TIHOMIR BEZLOV, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRACY, 
EXAMINING THE LINKS BETWEEN ORGANISED CRIME AND CORRUPTION 303–04 (2010), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/doc_centre/crime/docs/study_on_links_between_organised_crime_and_corruption_en.pdf. 
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express pessimism at the possibility of stopping corruption.167 Thus, 
there have been some encouraging steps, but corruption remains an 
immense problem. 
Moreover, the government’s increased efforts to stamp out money 
laundering and other lucrative efforts of criminal enterprise have 
forced Russian organized crime to adopt new methods and tactics.168 
Cybercrime seems to be one of the new enterprises that have replaced 
traditional Mafia activities. Russian cybercrime activities have evolved 
into some of the most complex in the world and malware produced by 
former soviet countries, including Russia, has “been dubbed the 
‘Faberge Egg[]’ of the malware world,” due to its elegance and 
sophistication.169 Russia has failed to take action to shut down 
cybercrime groups, even amidst public attention and pressure. For 
example, the Russian Business Network (RBN), a group engaged in a 
multitude of cybercrimes, including child pornography and identity 
theft, was shut down only after international internet service providers 
began to aggressively pursue them.170 There have been a couple 
instances of the Russian authorities arresting cybercriminals, but these 
cases have led to limited jail time and are unlikely to serve as an 
adequate deterrent to criminals.171 
As the next section will show, Russia has made some limited 
progress in recent years. However, its current efforts fall far short of 
what would be expected of it under the standard of due diligence. 
 
 167. Ivan Nechepurenko, Russians Lose Hope that State Can Tackle Corruption, 
Transparency Says, MOSCOW TIMES (July 10, 2013), http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news
/article/russians-lose-hope-that-state-can-tackle-corruption-transparency-says/482941.html.  
 168. Sokolov, supra note 147. 
 169. Tom Kellermann, Peter the Great Versus Sun Tzu, TREND MICRO (Sept. 2012), 
http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/spotlight-
articles/op_kellermann_peter-the-great-vs-sun-tzu.pdf (discussing differences between Russian 
and Chinese cybercrime groups). 
 170. John Barham, Russian Cybercrooks Adopt Lower Profile, SECURITY MGMT. (Apr. 1, 
2008), available at https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/Russian-Cybercrooks-Adopt-Lower-
Profile.aspx. Russia was repeatedly asked to coordinate in the fight against the RBN and 
refused to do so. See Brian Krebs, Shadowy Russian Firm Seen as Conduit for Cybercrime, 
WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 13, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/10/12/AR2007101202461.html?sid=ST2007101202661. 
 171. Robert Lipovsky et al., Cybercrime in Russia: Trends and Issues, ESET (2011), 
http://www.eset.com/us/resources/white-papers/CARO_2011.pdf.  
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VI. RUSSIA IS FALLING FAR SHORT OF ITS DUE DILIGENCE 
OBLIGATIONS 
Russia has taken some positive steps to combat cybercrime. 
However, its current efforts still fall short of the international 
requirements of due diligence. The following sections will examine 
Russia’s failure to fulfill the specific component of due diligence. 
First, Russian cybercrime causes trans-boundary cybercrime. Second, 
Russia should be held to a high level of due diligence. Third, Russia 
has fallen short of its due diligence obligation to prevent, protect, 
prosecute, and redress cybercrime. 
A. Russian Cybercrime Causes Trans-boundary Harm 
Much of the cybercrime occurring in Russia clearly meets the 
international standard for trans-boundary harm.172 First, cybercrime is 
clearly a result of human activity. Second, the Russian cybercrime 
groups are primarily utilizing Russian cyber-infrastructure including IP 
addresses to launch cyber-attacks.173 Thus, Russia is expected to exercise 
due diligence to monitor and prevent these trans-boundary activities. 
Additionally, the activities of cybercriminals and the Russian 
Mafia are clearly capable of giving rise to harm. With an economic 
toll of hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars annually, it is 
clear that on the aggregate these crimes rise to the level of 
“significant” or even “serious” harm. And a significant portion of 
the cybercrime emanating from Russia could also be classified as 
having physical consequences.174 Finally, a significant portion of the 
harm caused by the Russian Mafia impacts individuals or objects, 
such as computers or computer networks, located in other 
countries.175 Thus, the harm caused by the Russian Mafia and 
Russian organized crime rises to the level of trans-boundary harm 
and is sufficient to trigger Russia’s obligation to exercise due 
diligence in preventing, protecting against, prosecuting, and 
redressing transnational cybercrime. 
 
 172. See Ilașcu v. Moldova, 2004 Eur. Ct. H.R., 318 at ¶ 331. 
 173. For instance, all of the cyber attacks against Georgia were traced to Russian-based 
servers. See Tom Espiner, Georga Accuses Russia of Coordinated Cyberattack, CNET (Aug. 
2008), http://www.cnet.com/news/georgia-accuses-russia-of-coordinated-cyberattack/. 
 174. See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text. 
 175. See Casaretto, supra note 5. 
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B. The Degree of Diligence Expected of Russia 
The next question is in regard to the level of reasonableness or 
diligence to be expected of Russia. There is a strong case to be made 
that Russia should be held to a very high level of due diligence in 
regard to organized cybercrime. 
First, Russia has large financial resources and has shown a 
capacity to engage in projects of a large scale.176 Second, in terms of 
technological resources, Russia is considered one of the most 
technologically advanced countries in the world.177 Among similarly 
situated members of BRICS,178 Russia has been ranked as having far 
greater technological development.179 Russia is also notorious for 
having some of the most advanced military technology,180 and has 
even utilized hacking and other cyber activities in warfare.181 Thus, 
Russia is technologically well situated to wage a vigorous effort 
against cybercrime. 
Moreover, the Russian federal government has under presidents 
Putin and Medvedev increasingly centralized power.182 This includes 
 
 176. For instance, in 2014, the country hosted the most expensive Olympic games of all 
time. Although of course, the resources needed to engage in a protracted conflict against cyber 
criminals is different than those needed to build an Olympic stadium. Adam Taylor, Why Sochi Is 
By Far the Most Expensive Olympics Ever, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 17. 2014), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/why-sochi-is-by-far-the-most-expensive-olympics-ever-2014-1.  
 177. Kenneth Rapoza, Russia’s High Tech Promise, FORBES (Aug. 22, 2011), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2011/08/22/russias-high-tech-promise/; Andrew 
E. Kramer, Russia Takes Big Step into Technology, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/26/business/global/26ruble.html?_r=0.  
 178. The term BRICS refers to Brazil, Russia, India and China and was coined by 
economist Jim O’Neill. See Information about BRICS, BRICS, available at 
http://brics6.itamaraty.gov.br/about-brics/information-about-brics (last visited Sept. 26, 2015). 
 179. Joshua Keating, The Most Wired Country in the World is . . ., FOREIGN POL’Y, (Apr. 12, 
2013) , available at http://ideas.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/04/12/the_most_wired_count
ry_in_the_world_is. 
 180. Mark Galeotti, Russia’s Shiny New Toys, OPEN DEMOCRACY, (Jan. 10, 2014), available 
at http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/mark-galeotti/russia%E2%80%99s-shiny-new-
weapons; Russian Military Hardware Best in the World, PRAVDA, Dec. 19, 2012, 
http://english.pravda.ru/russia/economics/19-12-2012/123231-russia_military_hardware-0/.  
 181. See Isaac R. Porche III, Cyberwarfare Goes Wireless, U.S. NEWS (April 4, 2014), 
available at, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2014/04/04/russia-
hacks-a-us-drone-in-crimea-as-cyberwarfare-has-gone-wireless. 
 182. Paul Goble, New Regional Policy Draft Pushing Russia Toward Hyper-Centralized 
‘Post-Federalism,’ Shtepa Says, THE INTERPRETER, (June 1, 2015) 
http://www.interpretermag.com/new-regional-policy-draft-pushing-russia-toward-hyper-
centralized-post-federalism-shtepa-says/; Peter Baker, Putin Moves to Centralize Authority, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2004, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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state control of television and radio stations with President Putin 
recently dissolving one of the main state news agencies in order to 
create a television network focused on promoting a positive image of 
Russia.183 The Russian government has also heavily censored the 
internet and prosecuted journalists and bloggers for publishing 
“extremist” material.184 Russia’s efforts to censor and suppress 
extremist literature and block websites critical of the government 
evidence a great capacity to control and regulate internet activity.185 
Despite the margin of appreciation that is granted to states in 
attempting to institute unique policies and respond to state specific 
challenges,186 Russia’s attempts to censor internet speech and 
discourse cannot be credited as an effort to control cybercrime. As I 
have argued elsewhere, Russia’s laws are or should be considered a 
violation of the European Convention of Human Rights and a 
violation of both Freedom of Expression and Freedom of 
Conscience.187 Moreover, there is evidence of cyber-attacks 
(possibility state sponsored) being used as a tool to suppress 
opposition voices on the internet.188 Thus, Russia’s speech-
suppressing policies actually lead to the proliferation rather than the 
cessation of cybercrime and cyber-attacks. 
The seriousness of cybercrime being committed by Russians 
would require Russia to exercise a great degree of diligence. The 
economic harm caused by the cyber-attacks is significant, but other 
 
dyn/articles/A17838-2004Sep13.html. 
 183. Timothy Heritage, Putin Dissolves State News Agency, Tightens Grip on Russia 
Media, REUTERS, (Dec. 9, 2013), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/09
/us-russia-media-idUSBRE9B80I120131209. 
 184. See Draft Articles, supra note 110.  
 185. RIA NOVOSTI, Russian Media is Instrument of State Control, SPUTNIK (Apr. 12, 
2011), http://en.ria.ru/russia/20110412/163492415.html.  
 186. Another limitation on Russia’s ability to act is the fact that a not insubstantial 
portion of cybercrime comes from Chechen or other ethnic groups. Efforts to combat such 
groups may be fraught with ethnic and geo-political tension. On the other hand, Russia’s 
invasion of Georgia in 2007 and current occupation of Crimea displays a Russian willingness to 
take aggressive action when its national interests or citizens are in jeopardy. Thus, Russia can 
be expected to likewise exercise diligence to combat cybercrime stemming from contested or 
occupied territory.  
 187. Daniel Ortner, Note, Conscientious Offenders: Russia’s Ban on ‘Extremist’ Religious 
Literature, and the European Court of Human Rights, 56 VA. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming Oct. 2015). 
 188. Brigitte Hopstad, The Russian Media Under Putin and Medvedev: Controlled Media 
in an Authoritarian System (Feb. 2011) (unpublished master’s thesis, Norwegian University of 
Science and Technology), available at https://www.academia.edu/979916/The_Russian_me
dia_under_Putin_and_Medvedev_Controlled_media_in_an_authoritarian_system. 
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potential harm might be even more serious. Hacking tools in Russia 
are freely sold to any that wish to pay.189 Such technology and 
equipment, if not prevented, could easily be used to commit acts of 
terrorism or destruction.190 
C. Russia and the Obligation to Prevent Trans-boundary Cybercrime 
Having established that Russia would be held to a high standard 
of care, it will now be shown that for each of the four categories—
prevention, protection, prosecution, and redress—Russia’s current 
efforts fall short. 
On a broad level, it is worth noting the Information Security 
Doctrine of the Russian Federation, which sets out Russia’s cyber 
policies.191 The doctrine recognizes several flaws in current Russian 
cyber-security such as judicial corruption and lack of adequate 
laws.192 Unfortunately, the doctrine is lacking in specific suggestions 
and also focuses heavily on controlling information through 
censorship and counter-propaganda.193 Given its vagueness and the 
lack of concrete proposals, this doctrine is ill-equipped for dealing 
with the growing trans-boundary threat of organized cybercrime. 
1. Prevention 
Currently, Russia is not exerting due diligence to prevent the 
occurrence of cybercrime. One of the problems with Russia’s efforts 
to fight cybercrime has been its reactive rather than proactive 
nature.194 Money is spent on surveillance efforts or on attempts to 
 
 189. Carlton Purvis, Hacking Tools Fuel Russian Black Market, SECURITY MGMT. (Nov. 
7, 2012), http://www.securitymanagement.com/news/hacking-tools-fuel-russian-black-
market-0010836. 
 190. Such has happened with traditional military hardware. See Thomas Land, Islamic 
Terrorists and the Russian Mafia, 282 CONTEMP. REV. 264 (2003). 
 191. INFORMATION SECURITY DOCTRINE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (Approved 
Sept. 9, 2000), available at http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-
osndoc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fdcc32575d900298676/2deaa9ee15ddd24bc32575d9002c442b!
OpenDocument. 
 192. IAN LEIGH, INFORMATION SECURITY DOCTRINE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 
available at http://www.dcaf.ch/content/download/36442/528101/file/Doctrine_security_L
EIGH.pdf 
 193. Id. 
 194. Indeed, this has been a common criticism of the approach of governments world- 
wide. See Governments Spend too much on Cyber Surveillance and not Enough on Catching 
Crooks, INFO SECURITY, June 18, 2012, available at http://www.infosecurity-
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install anti-virus or anti-phishing tools to the exclusion of efforts to 
prevent actual attacks or arrest perpetrators.195 Yet, cybercrime 
experts argue that such an approach is ineffective and far too slow to 
respond to the instantaneous nature of cybercrime.196 Legislation 
criminalizing cybercrimes exists; however, as will be mentioned in 
the section on prosecutions, penalties may be too low to deter 
cybercrime. Existing laws also contain ambiguities that make them 
ineffective and inadequate. 
Currently, there are no state sponsored agencies conducting 
evaluations or assessments of security standards or measuring the 
effects of cybercrime. The government has been productively involved 
with the qualitative work of security organizations such as Group-
IB.197 Nevertheless, the government should independently seek to 
measure and evaluate its progress by conducting impact assessments.198 
International cooperation is another area where greater Russian 
effort is needed in order to meet the due diligence requirement of 
prevention. As already mentioned, Russia has voiced concerns over 
the European Convention on Cybercrime and has been unwilling 
to sign in part because of the fear that it will compromise “national 
sovereignty.”199 Russia has at times been reluctant to cooperate with 
international extradition efforts. However, this is an area in which 
Russia has a special treaty obligation; the Palermo Convention on 
Transnational Organized Crime, to which Russia is a signatory, 
urges states to “seek to conclude bilateral and multilateral 
agreements or arrangements to carry out or enhance the 
effectiveness of extradition.”200 
Russia has worked with other nations to combat cybercrime. For 
instance, in the case of Viacheslav Ivankov, a high-level individual in 
the Russian Mafia, Russian cooperation led to Ivankov’s arrest and 
 
magazine.com/view/26387/governments-spend-too-much-on-cyber-surveillance-and-not-
enough-on-catching-crooks/.  
 195. Id. 
 196. Anti-Virus Software Sucks Up Too Much Security Cash Claims Study, BBC NEWS 
(June 18, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-18456607. 
 197. GROUP IB, STATE AND TRENDS OF THE ‘RUSSIAN’ COMPUTER CRIME MARKET IN 
2010, available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/hsnnetwork/pdf/russian-cybercrime-
market.pdf. 
 198.  See supra note 100 and accompanying text.  
 199. Putin Defies Convention on Cybercrime, C-NEWS (Mar. 27, 2008) 
http://eng.cnews.ru/news/top/indexEn.shtml?2008/03/27/293913. 
 200. Palermo Convention, supra note 111, at art. 16, sub. 17. 
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conviction in a U.S. court.201 Likewise, cybercriminals have been 
arrested as a result of transnational cooperation.202 
On the other hand, Russia has been highly critical of American 
efforts to extradite Russian citizens.203 Russia also refused to offer 
assistance to Estonia following the very costly cyber-attacks that crippled 
the state’s cyber infrastructure, even though Estonia submitted a 
request for bilateral investigation under the Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaty (MALT).204 This refusal has been criticized as a violation of both 
international norms and Russia’s direct treaty obligations.205 
2. Protection 
Russia has taken some steps to facilitate the work of security 
agencies. There is currently a website on which individuals can 
report cybercrimes which have been committed or are being 
planned or prepared.206 There is also a Federal Security Service 
(FSB) e-mail address and phone number for reporting crimes.207 
Russia has also worked to develop new technologies to help 
agencies combat cybercrime.208 
However, these efforts do not seem to be highly effective. For 
instance, of 900 reported instances of the misuse of 
telecommunications networks for extremist or terrorist purposes, 
only about 100 of the instances were responded to and stopped.209 
 
 201. Selwyn Raab, Reputed Russian Crime Chief Arrested, N. Y. TIMES, June 9, 1995, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/09/nyregion/reputed-russian-crime-chief-
arrested.html. 
 202. FIGHTING RUSSIAN CYBERCRIME MOBSTERS: REPORT FROM THE TRENCHES, 
available at http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-
09/ALPEROVITCH/BHUSA09-Alperovitch-RussCybercrime-PAPER.pdf.  
 203. See Moscow Slams Hacker’s Extradition to U.S., RIA NOVOSTI, (Jan. 19, 2012), 
http://en.ria.ru/russia/20120119/170850006.html; U.S. Admits Delay in Informing Russia 
of Hacker’s Extradition, RIA NOVOSTI (Jan. 20, 2012),  
http://en.ria.ru/russia/20120120/170855620.html. 
 204. See Scott J. Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber-attacks 
in International Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 192 (2009), available at 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol27/iss1/7.  
 205. Id. 
 206. Committee of Experts on Terrorism, supra note 136.  
 207. Id. 
 208. Oscar Williams-Grut, The Lab Fighting Cybercrime: Russia’s Weapon in the War 
Against Hi-tech Gangs, INDEPENDENT July 27, 2013, available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/the-lab-fighting-
cybercrime-russias-weapon-in-the-war-against-hitech-gangs-8734594.html. 
 209. Committee of Experts on Terrorism, supra note 129. 
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The Federation Council of Russia held a meeting to address gaps in 
Russia’s cyber security, and acknowledged the lack of clear incident 
response models to respond to cyber incidents.210 Current security 
standards also fall short of recognized best practices.211 
In order to catch individuals involved with organized cybercrime, 
Russia should ensure that federal crime fighting organizations such 
as the FSB are involved.212 Doing so is necessary to reduce the 
possibility of corruption, which is more prevalent on the regional 
level.213 If efforts are left to the regional police, the high levels of 
corruption and mafia penetration are likely to limit prosecution to 
merely unaffiliated or rouge individuals. However, because even high 
profile individuals working for the Federal Government may be 
subject to corruption,214 it is also important to ensure some level of 
redundancy and oversight. 
In order to protect against cybercrime, Russia will likely have to 
invest more time and resources into training experts.215 As organized 
crime continues to devote more money and energy to hiring high-
quality information technology specialists, the government will have 
to do likewise in order to catch up with organized crime.216 Likewise, 
experts have recommended that Russia increase its training to 
“judicial, prosecutorial, investigative, and law enforcement 
 
 210. Benjamin Volcsko, Russia Crowdsourcing It’s Cyber Security Strategy: Clever 
Experiment or Solicitation of Internet Restriction Freedoms?, MONETARY CYBER SECURITY 
INITIATIVE, available at http://sites.miis.edu/cysec/2014/01/20/russias-crowdsourcing-
experiment-getting-the-peoples-opinion-on-the-new-cyber-security-strategy/. 
 211. Id. 
 212. There is currently legislation pending in the Duma to grant the FSB greater ability 
to respond to cybercrime. See Russian Government Calls for FSB to Tackle Cyber Crime, RIA 
NOVOSTI (Oct. 17, 2013), http://en.ria.ru/russia/20131017/184204651/Russian-
Government-Calls-for-FSB-to-Tackle-Cyber-Crime.html. 
 213. The criminalization of the Russian Security Aparatus is well-documented. Stephen 
McCombie, Josef Pieprzyk & Paul Watters, Cybercrime Attribution: An Eastern European Case 
Study, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 7TH AUSTRALIAN DIGITAL FORENSICS CONFERENCE 
(December 3, 2009).  
 214. An officer of the Russian Interior Ministry’s K Directorate, which investigates 
cybercrimes, was arrested and charged with corruption in 2012. Officer of Russian IT 
Directorate Arrested, RADIO FREE EUROPE (April 24, 2012), http://www.rferl.org/content/r
ussian_cybercrime_officer_arrested/24558486.html.  
 215. See John Leyden, Russian Cops Lack Kit to Fight Cybercrooks, Says Brit Security Buff, THE 
REGISTER (June 6, 2013), http://www.theregister.co.uk/Print/2013/06/06/private_sector_leading_rus
sian_cybercrime_cleanup/.  
 216. LOUISE I. SHELLEY, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORISM AND CYBERCRIME, 303–12 (Alan Bryden 
& Philipp Fluri eds., 2003), available at http://www.lake-
project.net/download/Germany/Security/Organized%20Crime,%20Terrorism%20and%20Cybercrime.pdf. 
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agencies.”217 Training on the user end should also be a state priority 
to help reduce incidents of cybercrime.218 Currently, no systematic 
programs exist to conduct this training. 
Involvement of private groups may also be critical in overcoming 
cybercrime. In 2003, Group-IB, a public company dedicated to 
digital crime investigation and computer forensic consulting, was 
established.219 Since establishment, Group-IB has assisted in the 
arrest of several criminals.220 Since 2012, there was a marked decrease 
in some parts of the Russian cybercrime market, in part as a result of 
the group’s efforts.221 Thus, the Russian Government’s involvement 
with the efforts of such private organizations to help protect against 
cybercrime represents one of the most promising signs of progress. 
Nevertheless, current levels of engagement with the private sector on 
matters of security remain low, and Russia is overall not doing 
enough to protect against cybercrime. 
3. Prosecution 
Russia’s work with Group-IB to catch cybercriminals is 
commendable and seems to signal a shift towards greater efforts at 
prevention of cybercrime and prosecution of offenders of such 
crimes.222 However, it is unclear whether these efforts have been 
successful in targeting organized crime groups rather than individual 
or “rogue” hackers. Russia has also prioritized domestic prosecutions 
to the exclusion of those causing harm to persons outside of the 
country. As one American cyber security expert explained, Russian 
“[h]ackers only really get prosecuted when they attack targets inside 
Russia.”223 Thus, the current legal regime perversely creates an 
 
 217. Russian Cybercrime: What Russia is Doing, and What it Should be Doing, INFO 
SECURITY (April 24, 2012), http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/view/25359/russian-
cybercrime-what-russia-is-doing-and-what-it-should-be-doing/. 
 218. Russia has acknowledged the importance of training citizens as part of its newest 
cybersecurity conception/plan. See infra Section VI. 
 219. GROUP IB, THREAT INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2012–2013, 
http://report2013.group-ib.com/.  
 220. In 2011, the group reported 10 cybercrime related arrests. Id. 
 221. Id. On the other hand, increased security, especially in the security sector, has led to 
a commensurate rise in spending on infrastructure among cybercrime groups. See Crackdown 
on Cybercriminals Equals Reduced Cybercrime in Russia, INFO SECURITY (Sept. 11, 2013), 
http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/view/34472/crackdown-on-cybercriminals-equals-
reduced-cybercrime-in-russia/. 
 222. See Lipovsky, supra note 171. 
 223. Ben Plesser, Skilled, Cheap Russian Hackers Power American Cybercrime, NBC 
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incentive for cybercrime groups to focus their efforts on 
international rather than domestic targets. 
The current penalties for cybercrime are also insufficient to act as 
a deterrent.224 Prior to 2011, those who committed massive trans-
boundary cyber-attacks received light sentences and no jail time; for 
instance, two hackers who stole ten million dollars from the Bank of 
Scotland received only suspended sentences.225 This was an especially 
glaring discrepancy given that common thieves often receive large 
sentences and jail time.226 In December 2011, the Duma enacted a 
criminal code reform, which included aggravated circumstances 
leading to an increased penalty.227 However, expert groups have 
criticized these steps as inadequate.228 In particular, the statute’s 
terminology is vague and ill-suited for responding to diverse cyber-
attacks.229 Potential profit from cybercrime still outweighs the 
potential risk of prosecution. Thus, current prosecutions are likely 
inadequate to deter the growth of cybercrime. 
4. Redress 
Russia has not directly adopted any known compensation 
schemes or efforts to assist trans-boundary victims. The Russian 
government has cooperated with groups, such as Group-IB, that 
specialize in incident response and in helping victims of cyber-attacks 
recover data and remove critical vulnerabilities.230 However there is 
no evidence of any such efforts being directed at international 
victims of trans-boundary harm. 
Russia has also failed to facilitate prosecutions in domestic 
courts. While, theoretically foreign nations have equal access to 
courts, in reality the court system is notoriously inaccessible to 
 
NEWS (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/skilled-cheap-russian-hackers-
power-american-cybercrime-n22371. 
 224. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.  
 225. Christopher Williams, Russian Hacker Avoids Jail for $10m Royal Bank of Scotland 
Raid, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/831624
6/Russian-hacker-avoids-jail-for-10m-Royal-Bank-of-Scotland-raid.html. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Russian Cybercrime: What Russia is Doing, and What It Should be Doing, supra note 217.  
 228. Id. 
 229. Russian Cybercrime Market Doubles in Size, HELP NET SECURITY (April 24, 2012), 
http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=12798. 
 230. CERT-GIB – COMPUTER SECURITY INCIDENT RESPONSE TEAM BY GROUP-IB, 
http://cert-gib.com/ (last visited September 15, 2014). 
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foreigners.231 Even though Russia’s legal system for enforcing 
contracts is ranked tenth in the world,232 rampant corruption would 
make private suits against individuals involved in organized crime 
activities especially unlikely to succeed.233 Getting witnesses to testify 
against members of organized crime is difficult because witnesses are 
often threatened and intimidated out of testifying.234 Thus, victims of 
trans-boundary cybercrime are likely out of luck in their efforts to 
seek compensation in the Russian court system. 
In each of the categories, Russia has fallen short of its due 
diligence obligation. Current legislation is inadequate to prevent 
trans-boundary crime, police efforts are woefully uncoordinated and 
ineffective, prosecutions for trans-boundary cybercrime are rare and 
riddled with corruption, and victims lack effective avenues of redress. 
In order to comply with its obligations, Russia would have to pass 
new legislation focused on cybercrime and vigorously enforce it. 
VII. CONCLUSION: FAILURE, BUT A SIGN FOR HOPE 
Yet, despite its current failings, there are signs that Russia is 
starting to acknowledge the importance of aggressively targeting 
cybercrime. In 2013, the Russian Federal Council organized an 
investigation into potential proposals to improve cyber security. In 
January 2014, the group put out a draft proposal that a governmental 
working group will review in an effort to craft legislation.235 These 
proposals would, if completely adopted and enforced, likely meet 
 
 231. Charles Clover, Russian Court Move Seen as Power Grab, FINANCIAL TIMES (Dec. 4, 
2012), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ea1bd9ac-3a0f-11e2-a00d-00144feabdc0.html. 
 232. International Finance Corporation, Ease of Doing Business in Russian Federation, 
WORLD BANK Group, http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/russia/#enfor
cing-contracts. 
 233. Firestone, supra note 153. 
 234. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Russia: Measures Implemented to Fight 
Police Corruption, including the Procedure for Filing a Complaint against the Police; the Witness 
Protection Program, REFWORLD (Nov. 8, 2011), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/5072b3af2.html. 
 235. CONCEPTION OF THE STRATEGY OF CYBERSECURITY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
(in Russian) [hereinafter CONCEPTION OF THE STRATEGY OF CYBERSECURITY], available at 
http://council.gov.ru/media/files/41d4b3dfbdb25cea8a73.pdf (author’s translation). For 
some public commentary critical of the plan, see Атаманова Г.А., Conception of the Strategy of 
Cybersecurity of the Russian Federation, АГАСОФИЯ (March 17, 2104), 
http://gatamanov.blogspot.com/2014/03/blog-post_17.html [Russian blog post]. 
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Russia’s due diligence obligations. The proposal addresses aspects of 
prevention, protection, prosecution and redress.236 
A. Prevention 
The document openly acknowledges existing gaps and seeks to 
increase the Russian Federation’s role in cyber-security on an equal 
level with regional and private efforts.237 The document calls for the 
systematizing of efforts and for much needed centralized 
coordination.238 The government is called to work with local 
governments, businesses and civilian organizations in order to 
achieve its goals.239 Specifically, the proposal calls for greater 
government interaction with the private sector including helping 
private companies develop better security practices.240 Citizens would 
also be encouraged to propose solutions to security problems.241 In 
order to encourage private involvement, the plan calls for tax 
subsidies and other government aid. It also calls for regular 
evaluations of the systems. In addition, scientific studies to analyze 
and research cyber security are encouraged. 
The plan calls for improved legislation on cyber-security 
including the adaptation of international legal norms and full 
compliance with ratified international agreements.242 In order to 
measure progress, the document recommends the development of 
new information security systems as well as criteria to evaluate the 
effectiveness of such systems.243 
The plan also calls for the growth in international cooperation 
especially in regard to limiting the spread and use of “information 
weapons.”244 Additionally, it calls for greater interaction and 
information sharing between domestic and international commercial 
 
 236. Encouragingly, one “basic principle” of the plan includes free and equal access to 
information and knowledge. CONCEPTION OF THE STRATEGY OF CYBERSECURITY supra note 
235 at III. 4, 3). In addition the plan mentions the need to avoid the extremes of a complete 
lack of security on the one hand and excessive regulation on the other. Id. at V 4).  
 237. Id. at III 1)–2). 
 238. Id. at VI 1).  
 239. Id. at III 3). 
 240. Id. at VI 4)–5). 
 241. Id. at VII 6).  
 242. Id. at VII 1)–2).  
 243. Id. at III 2).  
 244. Id. at III 2). 
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and corporate organizations.245 The plan likewise mentions the need 
for greater cooperation with foreign law enforcement agencies.246 
Finally, the plan does call for the development of agreements and 
mechanisms to improve global cyber-security as well as a 
harmonization of security standards.247 
Thus, the proposal is quite thorough in the area of prevention. It 
would improve international cooperation, data collection, and 
cooperation between state and non-state actors.248 Such efforts 
would almost certainly be sufficient to satisfy due diligence. 
B. Protection249 
Importantly, the plan emphasizes that security efforts should 
be prioritized to focus on the most serious and likely threats to 
cyber security.250 Such a priority, if implemented, would minimize 
many of the problems already discussed, such as the state focusing 
on small time criminals rather than those most heavily involved in 
organized cybercrime. 
In addition, the proposal calls for a uniform system of 
technological training, as well as a one-stop portal where members of 
the public can go for cyber-security tools as well as information and 
statistics about cybercrimes.251 The government would also seek to 
establish a national center to warn of cyber-threats.252 
There is also a general call to increase the cyber-literacy of 
Russian citizens through a “wide spread information campaign.”253 
University classes should be developed for all levels dealing with 
cyber issues.254 For civil servants, knowledge of technology and cyber 
security would become required, and regular training would be 
conducted to ensure that their training remains current.255 
 
 245. Id at III 6).  
 246. Id. at VII 2). 
 247. Id. at VII 1).  
 248. Id. at III 6).  
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 250. Id. at V 5)  
 251. Id. at III 2.  
 252. Id. at VI 1), VII at 5).  
 253. Id. at III 5), VII at 7). 
 254. Id. at VII 5). 
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The efforts at protection are also quite sweeping as they would 
include training of law enforcement personnel and the general 
public, as well as a focus on the most serious cybercrimes.256 Such 
efforts would likely be sufficient to satisfy due diligence. 
C. Prosecution257 
Of all of the areas, the plan focuses the least on increasing 
prosecutions. Nevertheless, the plan calls for increased penalties for 
crimes as well as penalty enhancements for traditional crimes 
committed with the help of cyber technology.258 If Russia 
implemented and enforced these enhanced penalties with a focus on 
the most serious and likely threats rather than small-time criminals, it 
could meet its due diligence obligation to prosecute. However, this is 
the one area where additional measures might be required to ensure 
that those most involved with organized cybercrime are prosecuted. 
Regardless, the proposal would be an enormous step forward. 
D. Redress259 
Redress is also not the primary focus of the plan. However, the 
plan calls for the development of incident response centers to 
detect, prevent, and eliminate the effects of cyber-attacks.260 In 
addition, the government would work with insurance companies to 
provide risk insurance against cybercrime as well as legal 
assistance.261 It is not entirely clear whether this aid would be 
offered to foreign companies and others injured by trans-boundary 
harm. However, an insurance-based model, possibly subsidized, 
might be an elegant and novel solution that offers aid to 
transnational corporations or other injured entities.262 
 
 256. Id. at VII 5).  
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at VII 2). 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at VII 1). 
 261. Id. at VII 6). 
 262. Of course, an insurance-based model might create perverse incentives, as the 
Russian mafia is already heavily involved with insurance fraud and insurance related schemes. 
Thus, an insurance-based scheme might create an incentive for the Mafia to aggressively sell 
cyber-insurance and perpetuate attacks to scare businesses into making these purchases. 
Without adequate prosecution and deterrence, focusing on providing insurance is likely to 
bolster rather than stymie the Russian Mafia’s conduct. See Jeffrey R. Hatcher, The Russian 
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The provisions of this plan are laudable and, if implemented, 
would likely be sufficient to ensure that Russia is in compliance with 
its international obligation of due diligence. This would be 
dependent on vigorous enforcement of the proposal as well as its 
application in a non-discriminatory fashion towards international 
organizations. It is entirely possible that such protocols would be 
enforced in such a way to only deter cybercrime against domestic 
organizations, which would actually provide an incentive for trans-
boundary cybercrime. Nevertheless, it seems that internal cyber-
security protocols are a necessary first step towards addressing the 
problem of trans-boundary harm. 
The Russian Government must now first approve the proposal. 
After approval, a working group comprised of members of the 
Security Council of the Russian Federation and other federal bodies, 
as well as representatives from public and private groups working on 
cyber issues, would be organized to develop specific protocols for the 
implementation of the plan.263 
Until such norms are ratified and implemented, Russia will 
continue to fail in its international obligation to exercise due 
diligence in the prevention, protection, prosecution and redress of 
international trans-boundary cybercrime. 
Daniel Ortner264 
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